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Meffert: Affirmative Maintenance Provisions in Historiacl Preservation: A

AFFIRMATIVE MAINTENANCE
PROVISIONS IN HISTORIC
PRESERVATION: A TAKING OF
PROPERTY?
I.

INTRODUCTION

A revolution has taken place in the field of historic preservation in recent years, a revolution that has had and will continue to have a major effect on the cultural environment. Since
the formation of the National Trust for Historic Preservation in
1949,1 the preservation movement has evolved significantly,
moving from an early concern with the protection of individual
buildings, sites, and objects, to a broader concern for the management of historic resources as part of our cultural environment, equal in importance to our natural areas. As the United
States Supreme Court noted in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,2 "historic preservation is but one aspect
of the much larger problem, basically an environmental one, of
enhancing-or perhaps developing for the first time-the quality
of life for people." 3
As preservation has broadened in scope, a partnership has
developed between the traditional private non-profit and profitmaking interests active in historic preservation and governmental units at the federal, state and local levels. While legislation
has been passed declaring historic preservation to be public policy at the federal 4 and state 5 levels, the major responsibility for

1. The National Trust for Historic Preservation, chartered by Congress, is the only
national, private non-profit organization with the responsibility for encouraging public
participation in the preservation of sites, buildings, and objects significant in American
history and culture. NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, ANNUAL REPORT

(1981).
2. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3. Id. at 108.

4. The National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470w-6, was passed
in 1966. The statute provides, in pertinent part:

The Congress finds and declares that(1) the spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic heritage;

713
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

1

South
Carolina
Law Review,
34, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5[Vol.
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAWVol.
REVIEW

34

cultural resources conservation lies at the local level. The municipal ordinance framework for historic resources management,
originating as early as 1931 in Charleston, South Carolina, 6 and
in 1937 in New Orleans, Louisiana,7 has now been enacted as
local government policy in over 800 communities nationwide.8
These local ordinances and the specific provisions within them
are the subject of this Note.

I.

HISTORIC PRESERVATION LEGISLATION

Two key issues are traditionally raised by local preservation
ordinances: (1) whether these ordinances are a legitimate use of
the police power, and (2) whether in enforcing these ordinances
local governments have "taken" private property for public use.
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve these issues in Penn
Central.9 The Court's approval of New York City's Landmark

(2) the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be
preserved as a living part of our community life and development in
order to give a sense of orientation of the American people;
(3) historic properties significant to the Nation's heritage are being
lost or substantially altered, often inadvertently, with increasing
frequency;
(4) the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public
interest so that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched
for future generations of Americans;...
16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
5. Most states have passed enabling statutes which allow local municipalities to pass
ordinances establishing historic districts and historic district commissions. The statutes
usually delineate the commissions' powers and duties. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 9462.01(A)(10) (Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-A-395 to -398 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 5-23-310 to -340 (1976); VA. CODE § 15.1-503.2 (1981).
6. The first historic district in the United States was established by ordinance in
Charleston, South Carolina, in 1931. P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 7.03
(1981) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN].
7. The Vieux Carre Historic District was established pursuant to a 1936 Louisiana
constitutional amendment. Id.
8. Local landmark and historic district commissions have been established in 832
communities in 48 states. NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION DIRECTORY OF
AMERICAN PRESERVATION COMMISSIONS (1981).

9. The Penn Central case arose when Penn Central Transportation Co., owner of
Grand Central Terminal in New York City, sought to erect a multi-story office building
above the terminal, which had been designated a "landmark site" by the local
Landmarks Preservation Commission. The Commission denied Penn Central's application for a permit to construct the building, and Penn Central filed suit claiming New
York's Landmark Preservation Law had "taken" their property by depriving them of
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Preservation Law'" and its finding that the law was not a "taking" of Penn Central's property gave legitimacy to local legislation for historic preservation purposes. This local legislation has
typically taken form as historic district or individual landmark
designation.
The most common method of historic preservation is the
designation of an historic district. This is essentially an exercise
of zoning for aesthetic purposes. Zoning has been recognized as a
valid exercise of the police power since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co." In Berman v. Parker,2 the Supreme Court, in
dictum, approved zoning enacted for purely aesthetic purposes.
The Court in Berman stated that "[it] is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful
as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled."' 3 Lower courts have recognized that
aesthetic controls produce economic benefits by encouraging private 4investment and by increasing property values and tourism.2 Historic district ordinances have been consistently upheld

against constitutional challenges, 5 as long as the ordinances are
not vague or arbitrarily enforced.
The judiciary typically approaches challenges to historic

any gainful use of the air rights above the building, and by diminishing the value of the
site. 438 U.S. at 130-31.
10. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq. (1976).
11. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The question in Euclid was whether the zoning ordinance
as enacted was a permissible exercise of the police power. Since Euclid, the power of
local governments to enact zoning ordinances has been clearly recognized. The question
has shifted to whether the enforcement of a particular ordinance effects a taking of an
individual's private property.
12. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
13 Id. at 33. State courts have also approved zoning based predominantly on aesthetics. See, e.g., Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1967); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
14. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364
(1941); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941). A study
pulished by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation showed that property values
in designated historic districts in four cities surveyed had increased by an annual average
of 43% (Alexandria, Va.); 11% (Galveston, Tx.); 23% (Savannah, Ga.); and 17% (Seattle, Wash.). Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, THE CONTRIBUTION OF HIsToRIc
PRESERVATION TO URBAN REVITALIZATION

(1979).

15. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd,
516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975); Rebman v. City of Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 430, 250
N.E.2d 282 (1969); City of Sante Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13
(1964).
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district designations by determining whether a valid public purpose has been served and whether the means to accomplish that
purpose are valid.16 The general benefits to be derived by all
property owners within an historic district are usually consid-

ered to offset any impact of restrictions on use.17 The Louisiana
Supreme Court pioneered this rationale in City of New Orleans
v. Pergament,18 in which the court held that the local preservation commission had the power to regulate exterior design features of all buildings within the district, regardless of whether
they were of architectural or historical significance. This tout
ensemble rationale recognizes that the quality of an area derives
not from individual buildings, but from the unique combination
of buildings in an area and their harmony with each other.
In addition to the zoning type regulation found in historic
district legislation, individual landmark designation is also an
important preservation tool. Few cities have all historic buildings gathered in one location. Therefore, the ability to afford isolated landmarks the same type of protection as that found
within an historic district is critical in many American cities. A
rationale used to support zoning and historic district regulations
is that all owners stand to benefit from a common scheme. This
rationale is not as justifiable with individual landmarks. The Supreme Court upheld landmark designation in Penn Central
when it found that the New York landmarks law benefited "all
New York citizens and all structures, both economically and by
improving the quality of life in the city as a whole." 19 This reasoning seems equally applicable to smaller cities.
Beyond the designation of historic districts and individual
landmarks, local ordinances frequently empower preservation
commissions to require affirmative duties of property owners.
These regulations take the form of anti-neglect or minimum
maintenance provisions20 which are built into local historic pres-

16. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d at 1059-66.
17. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 858, 5 So. 2d 129, 131
(1941).
18. 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
19. 438 U.S. at 134.
20. See, e.g., CHARLESTON, S.C. CODE §§54-23 to -35 (1975); CORAL GABLES, FLA.
CODE § 8.3, NEW ORLEANS, LA. CODE (Vieux Carre) Art. III, §§ 65-36 to -40. SAVANNAH,
GA. CODE, § 9.4, SEATTLE, WASH. ORD. No. 102, 902 §§ 6A-6D. For a discussion of these
provisions, see Weidle, Historic Preservation Ordinances, 8 CONN. L. REv. 209, 213-24
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ervation ordinances and designed to confront the problem of
"demolition by neglect." Historic preservation ordinances frequently require the issuance of a permit before buildings within
an historic district may be demolished."1 To circumvent these
anti-demolition provisions, a recalcitrant owner may allow a
building to deteriorate until it becomes a health or safety hazard
and the health or building inspector orders it demolished. Thus,
the owner is able to do indirectly what the anti-demolition ordinance sought to prohibit. Minimum maintenance provisions are
the response to this problem. Typically, the provisions empower
the local historic district commission to identify buildings in
need of repair and notify owners of the needed repairs. If work
is not commenced within a specified time, the commission may
hold a hearing allowing the property owner to appear and provide reasons for noncompliance. If the owner still fails to comply
after a hearing, the city council may be empowered to make the
22
repairs at the city's expense and place a lien on the property.
The ordinances vary in degree of specificity of what constitutes
neglect requiring affirmative action. Some ordinances merely require that buildings be maintained in accordance with the local
building code,2 3 while others are extraordinarily detailed, specifying exactly what structural defects will not be tolerated.2 '
The enforcement of these minimum maintenance provisions
opens historic preservation ordinances to a new challenge:
whether the requirement of affirmative action on the part of a
property owner effects a taking of his property in violation of
the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. 25 A sur(1975).
21. The requirement of a permit for demolition, often called an anti-demolition provision, is commonly included in historic district ordinances. Some historic district commissions are empowered to deny demolition indefinitely, while others can only delay
demolition for a limited period of time. See ROHAN, supra note 6, at § 7.03[2].

22. See, e.g., NEw ORLEANS, LA. CODE §§ 65-36 to -40.
23. See, e.g., CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE § 54-32 (1975).

24. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., OR. No. 102, 902 §§ 6A-6D, which breaks down its
maintenance provisions into weather protection, structural defects, and fire and safety
hazards. The ANDERSON, S.C. COMMERCIAL MAINTENANCE CODE requires repair or replacement of decorative elements on building fronts and sides abutting streets. Specific duties
and responsibilities are detailed, from maintenance of sidewalks and curb cuts to windows and signs. ANDERSON, S.C., COMMERCIAL MAINTENANCE CODE (Jan. 1980).
25. U.S. CONST., amend. V. The fifth amendment was made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
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34

vey of the Supreme Court's analysis of the taking issue and the
tests used to determine whether a taking has occurred is necessary to consider this challenge.

Ill.

THE TAKING ISSUE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A CHANGING
VIEW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

An analysis of the current judicial attitude toward taking is
best understood within the context of the changing attitude toward property rights in our legal history.2 8 In medieval England,
property was held at the sufferance of the sovereign2 7 who had
original and absolute ownership of property. By the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, however, individual property rights
were highly exalted. 28 The views of Sir William Blackstone, who
stated "[s]o great moreover is the regard of the law for private
property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no,
not even for the general good of the whole community,"2 9 influenced the drafters of our Constitution. The drafters, however,
were also influenced by Locke's natural rights theory of property
ownership which envisioned a need for governmental regulation
of property.30
The right not to be deprived of property without just compensation, although not included in the body of the Constitution, appeared in the Bill of Rights. The requirement of the taking clause that just compensation be paid when property is
taken represents a compromise between an absolute view of in-

26. For a discussion of this topic, see Cohen, Propertyand Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 8 (1927); Donaldson, Regulation of Conduct in Relation to Land-The Need to
Purge Natural Law Constraintsfrom the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 187 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Donaldson]; Horwitz, The Transformation in the
Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 248 (1973);
Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Propertyin Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Philbrick]; Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil
Rights, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 135 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Powell]; Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights as the Foremost Principleof Civil Liberties: The First
Decade of the Burger Court, 43 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 66 (1980).
27. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 53 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as BOSSELMAN].

28, Philbrick, supra note 26, at 712.
29. BOSSELMAN, supra note 27, at 90 (citing 1 BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

at 138-

39).
30. Leeson & Sullivan, Property, Philosophy and Regulation: The Case Against a
Natural Law Theory of Property Rights, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 527, 562 (1981).
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dividual property rights and the right of government to take
property.
Since the taking clause became part of our jurisprudence,
the rights of property owners have been subject to changing societal needs and interests. As one commentator has stated:
Restrictions and freedom are two facets of the same social factor. You must be restricted so that I have liberty. Similarly, I
must be restricted so that you can have freedom. The task of
any government worth its salt is to keep the restrictions sufficiently strong to assure to all equal freedoms. 'Property rights,'
at any moment of time, represent the current wisdom as to
how this balance is best served."1
Restrictions on private property rights are not a recent phenomenon. Property rights include the power of disposition and
the power to use.2 The power of disposition has been limited by
the Rule against Perpetuities-in effect since the seventeenth
century,3 3 limits on restraints on alienation-common since the
twelfth century, 34 formal requirements of deeds and wills,3 5 and
laws precluding restrictions by a donor on the future conduct of
the donee.3
Restrictions on use have also been based on the greater
needs of society. Easements by necessity, the law of nuisance,
the regulation of water rights, building codes, health regulations,
and zoning recognize the right of the state to limit or control the
use of private property. As regulations and restrictions on use
have increased, landowners have resorted to the argument that
property rights are absolute and that the police power, when
used to an excessive degree, becomes a taking of property without just compensation. Just as the right to exclude yielded to
government regulation in the civil rights era, these increased restrictions can only be considered properly when property is
viewed as a dynamic concept, changing as the public's needs de-

31. Powell, supra note 26,
FINED 84

at 139-40 (citing BENTHAM, LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DE-

(Everett ed. 1945)).

32. Powell, supra note 26, at 140.
33. See 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 11 759-90 (1980).
34. See 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 77 839-48 (1979).

35. See 6A POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 11879-85 (deeds); 7 POWELL,
939-60 (wills) (1979).
36. See 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 1 849 (1979).
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mand 3 7 As Justice Sutherland stated in Euclid, "while the
meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of
their application must expand or contract to meet the new and
different conditions which are constantly coming within the field
'
of their operation."38
IV.

APPROACHES TO THE TAKING QUESTION-TESTS USED BY
THE COURTS

The taking concept is derived from the fifth amendment
clause which states "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 9 The question of whether a
taking has occurred often arises in those situations when governmental actions, although not intended to take property, are challenged as excessively regulatory. This implicit taking typically
arises in the context of an exercise of the police power to regulate property owners in some way. Regulation was recognized as
a taking in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,4 ° when Justice
Holmes wrote "[t]he general rule at least is, that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking. ' 41 In contrast, the taking issue

rarely arises in the context of the government's exercise of its
eminent domain power. When government condemns private
property for public use, an explicit taking has clearly occurred
and compensation must be paid.
No single analytical approach to determine whether there
has been a taking emerges from a reading of the Supreme Court
cases. As Justice Holmes noted in Pennsylvania Coal, the determination of a taking is "a question of degree-and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions."

2

Courts have

37. Donaldson, supra note 26, at 190.
38. 272 U.S. at 387.

39, U.S. CONST., amend. V. For a discussion of the taking issue, see generally
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of

"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Michelman]; Sax, Takings, Private Propertyand Public Rights, 81 YALE: L.J. 149 (1971);
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax,
Police Power].
40. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
41. Id. at 415.
42. Id. at 416. In his dissent to San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
Justice Brennan recognized the difficulty of the taking question, and cited various corn-
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developed a number of tests to analyze the taking issue, none of
which is considered dispositive of the question. The choice of
the test to be applied depends on the facts of the case at hand.
An early test applied by courts was the physical invasion
test. The physical invasion test came into use in the nineteenth
century as the judicial response to early taking challenges. The
test can be viewed as two slightly different rules. The first, and
narrower approach is that a taking can only occur when the government has actually appropriated or occupied the property in
question.4" An extension of the test would find a taking when
governmental action causes a physical invasion of property, such
as when a dam floods an individual's property. 4" Today's courts
never deny compensation when a permanent physical occupation
has occurred.4 5
A second method used to determine when a taking had occurred was the noxious use test. This test developed simultaneously with the physical invasion test, but focused on the property owner's activities, rather than on the nature of the
governmental activity. Justice Harlan explained the test as
"[t]he exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance . . . is very different from
taking property. . . . In the one case, a nuisance only is abated;
in the other, unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner. ' 46 Thus, when a use is deemed noxious, a regulation
limiting or preventing it is not considered a taking. A common
rationale to explain the test is the private fault-public benefit
analysis.4 7 The idea is that compensation is required if the public "helps itself to good at private expense, but not when the
public simply requires one of its members to stop making a nui-

mentators and their characterizations of the problem. A partcularly colorful description
is that of taking as "the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use law ... one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for
the quark." 450 U.S. 621, 649 n.15 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting C. HAAR,
LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976)).
43. See, e.g., Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
44. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871); Goodall v. City of
Milwaukee, 5 Wis. 32 (1856).
45. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982). In
Loretto, the Court revived the physical invasion test and held that a permanent physical
occupation authorized by government will always result in a taking. Id. at 3171.
46. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
47. For a discussion of this theory, see Michelman, supra note 39, at 1196-1201.
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sance of himself.

The application of the noxious use test requires a determination of what uses create a nuisance. This determination lies
with legislators and judges and varies with current thinking. As
Justice Sutherland stated in Euclid, a nuisance is simply "a
right thing in the wrong place-like a pig in the parlor instead of
the barnyard.'4 Early cases found a nuisance in the manufacture of beer," the operation of a livery stable,51 and the operation of a brickyard.52 The subjective judgments required to apply the noxious use test have made its application unpredictable.
The nuisance quality of a particular land use frequently.
arises from its incompatibility with competing uses in the area.
53 the city of Los Angeles had grown
In Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
up around plaintiff's brickyard. The United States Supreme
Court upheld an ordinance making it unlawful to operate a
brickyard within the city limits, finding that the health and
comfort of the community precluded any limitation on the police power.5 4 The "noxiousness" here arose not from the operation of the brickyard but rather from its location within the city.
Another example of incompatibility is found in Miller v.
Schoene,55 in which the complainant's cedar trees threatened to
spread cedar rust to nearby apple orchards. The complainant
was required to destroy his cedar trees without compensation
because of the threat they'posed to the apple trees. 6
The noxious use test has been criticized as an oversimplified
distinction between good and bad:
Most human activities held to be noxious, are, at most, inappropriate to the location or in conflict with other uses in the
area rather than "bad." The slaughterhouse and the brickyard
are socially important and useful, but unfortunately offend our
sensibilities when located in residential areas. Nevertheless, we

48. Id. at 1196.

49. 272 U.S. at 388.
50. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
51. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
52. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 410-11.
55. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
56. The Court in Miller used a balancing test and found the economic value of the
apple trees to be greater than the cedars. Id. at 279.
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all want them to continue somewhere, but elsewhere. A doctrine that allows such activities to be completely destroyed
without compensation is without question unfair. 7
The Supreme Court discounted the noxious use test in Penn
Central and observed that the decisions in Hadacheck and
Miller are "better understood as resting not on any supposed
'noxious' quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground
that the restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a policy-not unlike historic preservation-expected to
produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property."5 8
The public benefit rationale has led to a third test which
balances public benefit against private harm. The balancing test,
suggested by language in Pennsylvania Coal, is most commonly
used to determine whether a regulation is within the police
power of the government; that is, whether the regulation's purpose is a legitimate governmental objective.5 9 Courts have also
applied the balancing test to determine compensability 0 and
have found a taking when the public gains little in relation to
the harm inflicted on the individual property owner."1 The difficulties in measuring both private harm and public benefit have
made this test troublesome in application. The scope of public
benefit is so difficult to measure that courts often slight the public need for regulatory measures. 2
A fourth test is diminution in value. This test was formulated by Justice Holmes6 8 and appears in Pennsylvania Coal, in
which he stated:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must

57.
(1974).
58.
59.
60.
(1976).
61.
62.
63.

Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165, 174
438 U.S. at 134 n.30.
Michelman, supra note 39, at 1193 n.62.
Id. See, e.g., Gulh v. Par-3 Golf Club, Inc., 238 Ga. 43, 44-45, 231 S.E.2d 55, 57
Michelman, supra note 39, at 1193.
See id. at 1193-96.
Sax, Police Power, supra note 39, at 41.
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have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are
gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is
the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise
of
64
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.
Thus, if government regulation results in too great a decrease in
property values, compensation will be necessary.
Diminution in value is currently a popular approach used by
lower courts to decide the taking question15 because it adapts to
cases not involving a physical invasion or nuisance. The test is
often applied as a component of the balancing test described
above to measure the degree of private harm.
The degree of diminution tolerated before a taking has occurred is a major difficulty with the diminution in value test.
Zoning cases decided under this test illustrate the range of diminished values tolerated. Ordinances have been upheld that diminished property values from $1,500,000 to $225,000,1 s
$450,000 to $50,000, 7 and $52,500 to $10,500,s while an ordinance has been struck down that reduced property value from
$350,000 to $100,000.69 These illustrations demonstrate that the
diminution in value test is no more predictable in outcome than
previous tests because it requires a case by case analysis.
In Penn Central,Justice Brennan stated that diminution in
value alone will not establish a taking" and instead focused on
the uses that the regulation in question permitted. 71 Applying
this approach to the facts in Penn Central,the Court found that
New York City's Landmark Preservation law did not interfere
with Penn Central's primary expectations for the property and
that the law permitted a reasonable return on Penn Central's
investment.72 Thus, the Court seems to have shifted its analysis
from a consideration of whether property values have been di-

64. 260 U.S. at 413.
65. Sax, Police Power, supra note 39, at 50.
66. Gardner v. Downer, 61 Misc. 2d 131, 305 N.Y.S.2d 252 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
67. Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963).

68. Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Il. 2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406
(1960).

69,
70.
71.
72.

Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962).
438 U.S. at 131.
Id. at 136.
Id.
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minished, to what the landowner's investment expectations were
and the uses for the property permitted after application of the
regulation.
A year later, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,7 3 the Su-

preme Court found a taking in a case where reasonable investment expectations were impaired. The property owners in Kaiser Aetna had converted a shallow pond into a marina by
dredging it and connecting it with a navigable bay. The Court
found a taking 4 had occurred when the federal government
sought to compel public access to the private marina. 75 The fol-

lowing year, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 6 the
Court emphasized the importance of real impairment of value or
use to the taking issue. Finally, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,7
the Supreme Court focused on the uses permitted by an openspace zoning ordinance and the ability of the property owners to
pursue their "reasonable investment expectations" in the property. 78 As these cases illustrate, the Court's approach to the diminution in value test is from a prospective viewpoint, looking at
future uses and whether they fit in with the property owner's
reasonable expectations, rather than simply at the actual loss of
value. This approach is far more subjective than the comparison
of diminished value to original value prevalent in earlier cases.
In Agins, the Court also relied on another test involving the
reciprocity of benefits from a regulation." Closely related to the

73. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).

74. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, characterized the taking in Kaiser
Aetna as the physical invasion variety, although he relied on the interference with in-

vestment expectations in his decision. Id. at 179-80. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text for discussion of the physical invasion test.
75. The government argued that the marina was subject to the federal navigational
servitude because the owners had dredged a channel connecting it to a "navigable
water." 444 U.S. at 168, 170.
76. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In Pruneyard,the owner of a shopping center argued that
the right to exclude had been taken from him when the California Supreme Court prevented him from excluding from his property high school students soliciting support for
a political cause. The Court found that prohibiting the owner from excluding these students was not an infringement of his property rights under the taking clause. Id. at 83.
77. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
78. Id. at 262. The Court also relied on the reciprocal benefits shared by the property owners under the ordinance. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
79. The reciprocity test is derived from Justice Holmes' statement in Pennsylvania
Coal that a regulation was justified without compensation because "it secured an average
reciprocity of advantage." 260 U.S. at 415.
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balancing and diminution in value approaches, the reciprocity
test focuses on the degree of compensation provided by reciprocal benefits flowing from the broad application of a regulation.
When the burdens are shared evenly, it is assumed the benefits
will offset them.

V.

THE TAKING TESTS APPLIED TO MAINTENANCE PROVISIONS

As the preceding discussion of the Supreme Court's approach to the taking clause illustrates, no clearly accepted standard exists to use in viewing minimum maintenance provisions
and their constitutionality. Since any of the tests might conceivably be applied by a court, a consideration of all relevant tests is
necessary.
While the Supreme Court apparently disapproved the noxious use test in Penn Central, this test could be instructive in a
minimum maintenance challenge.8 0 The owner who refuses to repair and maintain a building within an historic district may create a nuisance by allowing the building to deteriorate and thus
detract from the surroundings. When the level of deterioration is
sufficient, the noxious use test could be applicable to uphold a
minimum maintenance provision.
Reciprocity is important in an analysis of affirmative maintenance provisions, and at least one court has relied on the
benefits flowing to owners in an historic district upholding a
maintenance provision. In Figarsky v. Historic District Commission of Norwich,"1 the Connecticut Supreme Court referred to
the economic benefits to be derived by owners in an historic district due to the increase in property values.8 2 The increase in
value of a building subject to a maintenance provision should
have the effect of increasing surrounding property values. In
fact, a maintenance provision, stringently applied, would have
the effect of ungrading entire areas, allowing for the sharing of
benefits and burdens assumed by the reciprocity theory.
The balancing and diminution in value tests are best considered together because the degree of private harm is measured

80. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
81. 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d 163 (1976).
82. Id. at 208, 368 A.2d at 170. For a study documenting the increase in property

values in historic districts, see supra note 14.
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by diminution in value of the subject property. The economic
impact of maintenance provisions makes these tests particularly
relevant. The unique feature of maintenance provisions is the
requirement of affirmative action on the part of property owners.8 3 While compliance with an affirmative maintenance provision may require the outlay of money, it also results in an increase in the value of the property. Therefore, the traditional
diminution in value test is not particularly helpful. The current
version of the test,8 4 however, is relevant in analyzing the main-

tenance provisions because the Court's recent focus is on economic impact measured by reasonable investment expectations
and permitted future uses.
In Maher v. City of New Orleans,"s the Fifth Circuit Court

83. The law is generally reluctant to impose affirmative duties on property owners.
Affirmative covenants were disfavored in early law and still must touch and concern the
land to be enforced in some states. See, e.g., Neponsit Property Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v.
Emigrant Indus. Savings Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938). Traditional tort law
did not require the possessor of land to protect those outside the premises, but this rule
has changed in recent times to require maintenance of trees along public highways. See,
e.g., Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry., 199 Wis. 575, 227 N.W. 385 (1929).
Nuisance law also may require an affirmative duty of a property owner, as when
alterations in land cause surface water to flow onto adjoining property. The offending
owner may be required to construct a retaining wall to restrict the flow. See, e.g., Tortolano v. DiFilippo, 115 R.I. 496, 349 A.2d 48 (1975). This type of affirmative duty is comparable to a situation in which a property owner has allowed a building to deteriorate to
the level of a nuisance. The imposition of an affirmative duty to repair seems no more
confiscatory than in the surface water 'ituation.
Affirmative duties are also required of property owners ordered to comply with
health and safety codes. These ordinances commonly require the owner to spend money
to comply, but impose a limit of "reasonable" expense. See, e.g., Adamec v. Post, 273
N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937); Health Dept. of N.Y. v. Rector of Trinity Church, 145
N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895).
Some states require affirmative duties to maintain irrigation ditches and embankments. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 3784-101, -119 (1973). California has a statute requiring that property owners keep trees and bushes trimmed so as not to shade neighboring solar collectors. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 25982 to 83 (West Supp. 1982).
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme Court found a
taking in the installation of cables for television service on an apartment building. The
Court indicated that it would uphold a duty imposed on the owner of the building to
install the cables. The Court noted that imposing the duty on a building's owner would
present a different question because the owner rather than the cable company would
control the installation. 102 S. Ct. at 3176, 3179 n.19.
84. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
85. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1975). The complainant in
Maher sought to demolish a Victorian cottage adjacent to his residence in the Vieux
Carre district of New Orleans in order to erect a seven-apartment complex on the site.
The Vieux Carre Commission denied Maher's request for a demolition permit and insti-
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of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a minimum maintenance provision." The complainant argued that the application
of the maintenance provision to his property was a taking on
two grounds:87 first, it prevented the most profitable use of the
property, and second, an affirmative maintenance provision may
not be imposed without invoking the power of eminent domain.
The court relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Goldblatt
5 Euclid, and Hadacheck as indicating
v. Town of Hempstead,"
that an ordinance within the police power does not become an
unconstitutional taking merely because property does not
achieve its maximum economic potential as a result of its operation.89 Since the complainant did not demonstrate that the ordinance so diminished the value of the property as to leave him
nothing, there was no taking.9 0 The court suggested that if the
owner had shown that sale, rental, or other potential use was
impractical, his taking claim would have carried more weight.9 1
Thus, the court implied that if the owner's investment expecta-

tions are totally thwarted and no reasonable92 future use is permitted, the ordinance would effect a taking.
Addressing the second ground of Maher's claim, the court

tuted proceedings against him for violation of the maintenance provisions of the Vieux
Carre Ordinance. Id. at 1054.
86. NEw ORLEANS, LA., CODE §§ 65-36, -37. The ordinance provided in partAll buildings and structures in that section of the city known as the Vieux
Carre Section ... shall be preserved against decay and deterioration and free
from certain structural defects in the following manner, by the owner thereof
...
[who] shall repair such building if it is found to have any of the following
defects:
There follows a list of unsafe or deteriorated conditions, including falling portions of
buildings, deteriorated or inadequate foundation, floors, walls, supports, ceilings, roofs,
chimneys, and ineffectively watertight exterior or windows.
87. Maher also argued that the ordinance violated due process due to inadequate
standards and arbitrary enforcement. 516 F.2d at 1058-64.
88. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
89. 516 F.2d at 1065.
90. The court noted that, while a substantial diminution in value may be evidence
of a taking, "it is by no means conclusive." Id. at 1066, n.83 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
91. 516 F.2d at 1066.
92. In Figarsky v. HistoricDist. Comm'n, the Connecticut Supreme Court used similar reasoning to uphold a minimum maintenance provision, stating that "[i]t is only
when the regulation practically destroys or greatly decreases the value of a specific piece
of property that relief may be granted. . .

."

171 Conn. 198, 211-12, 368 A.2d 163, 171

(1976) (citing Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn.
257, 261, 121 A.2d 637 (1956)).
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reasoned that once the purpose of the affirmative maintenance
ordinance has been held valid, upkeep of buildings is reasonably
necessary to accomplish that purpose. Comparing the ordinance
provisions with those commonly imposed for fire, safety or
health purposes, the court observed that if money may be spent
for these objectives, it is reasonable to require out of pocket expenditures in pursuit of other valid goals. This analogy is not
wholly appropriate, however, because an owner ordered to comply with health and safety regulations has the option of withdrawing the building from the market and demolishing it. This
option is not available to an owner in an historic district that
enforces an anti-demolition ordinance.
Finally, the Court of Appeals in Maher cautioned that every
application of affirmative maintenance ordinances would not be
beyond constitutional assault;9 3 regulations could not be "unduly
oppressive" to property owners. 9 4 An ordinance is probably unduly oppressive when it requires extensive repairs to a building
having no reasonable future use, thus making the repairs economically infeasible. A Missouri court opinion upholding an
anti-demolition provision is informative of what courts consider
economically feasible: "If the owner is unable to restore from an
economic standpoint he must then establish it is impractical to
sell or lease the property or that no market exists for it at a
reasonable price. 'e5 Under these circumstances, application of
an affirmative maintenance provision would likely be held an
unconstitutional taking of property. The balancing test as applied to minimum maintenance provisions will, therefore, depend on the extent of the economic impact as measured by the
potential future uses of the property. Only when the potential
return on the property is minimal will the degree of harm outweigh the public benefits to be gained from maintenance of historic buildings.
The results under these tests indicate that maintenance

93. 516 F.2d at 1067.

94. Id.
95. Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment, 599 S.W.2d 61, 66 (Mo.

Ct. App. 1980). The claim in this case was based on a denial of due process rather than a
taking of property.

In Cleckner v. City of Harrisburg, 101 Dauph. Co. 134 (1979), a Pennsylvania trial
court ruled a showing of economic infeasibility includes a demonstration that a sale of
the property is impossible or impractical.
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provisions will be upheld except in cases of extreme economic
hardship. No easily applied theory emerges from the various approaches taken by courts, but clearly the question is one of degree to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Since no ordinance
has ever been shown to be unconstitutional on its face, only one
applied to a structure with little or no potential use should be
questioned."6
At least one court has expressed a concern that requiring
affirmative duties may discourage private citizens from purchasing and maintaining landmark or historic properties.9e While
this may be a legitimate concern, the benefits to be derived from
maintaining historic neighborhoods and buildings seem to outweigh the burdens. The reciprocal economic benefits attained by
increasing property values in an historic district and the mitigating factors increasingly available to owners of historic properties,
such as tax advantages"9 and transferable development rights,99
make it unlikely that citizens will be discouraged from purchasing landmark or historic properties.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In view of the national concern with our architectural heritage and cultural environment, and the general acceptance of
design controls within historic preservation ordinances, the en96. The specifics of particular ordinances would not really affect the outcome of a
taking claim, because the application to a particular property is the critical point. The
ordinances vary greatly in specificity of what constitutes "needed repairs," but these provisions may be more readily attacked on due process grounds as arbitrary standards. See
Maher v. New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1061-63 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905
(1975).
97. Citizens Comm. to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. Dist. of Columbia Dept. of
Housing and Community Dev., 432 A.2d 710 (D.C. 1981).
98. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 provides significant tax incentives for
historic preservation, including a 25 percent investment tax credit for rehabilitation of
qualified historic buildings. For a discussion of the law's basic provisions see National
Trust for Historic Preservation, Summary of Preservation Tax Incentives in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Information Sheet No. 30 (Sept. 1981). See also Comment, Allocating the Cost of Historic Preservation: Compensation for the Isolated
Landmark Owner, 74 Nw. U.L. Rav. 646, 666 (1979).
99. Transferable development rights allow owners of landmark sites to transfer development rights to other parcels. The concept is an attempt to compensate owners of
historic buildings situated in high land value areas by allowing them to sell unused air
rights to the developer of another site. See Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York
City, 36 L. AND CONTMP. PROB. 372
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forcement of minimum maintenance provisions is a reasonable

use of local government's power to regulate private property for
public purposes. The enforcement of affirmative maintenance

provisions will not effect a taking of property except in cases of
extreme economic hardship. The provisions can be upheld under
the noxious use test if the degree of deterioration is sufficient to
create a nuisance. The reciprocity test, while not providing justification by itself, supports the economic impact approach used
by the Supreme Court in Penn Central and Agins.
Courts must look at how maintenance provisions are applied
to determine the impact on the individual property owner. Local
municipalities must carefully consider this impact and refrain
from enforcement when no reasonable potential use for a building exists. Failure to do so may force municipalities to pay compensation. In a situation in which potential future use is unlikely
and the cost of repairs high, local governments would be wise to
allow demolition rather than enforce a maintenance provision.
Thoughtful application of maintenance provisions by local government, combined with cooperation from owners of historic
buildings, will provide great benefits for our communities by improving the quality of our environment, as well as preserving our
architectural heritage.
Judy G. Meffert
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